The Belvedere Private Hospital provides cosmetic surgery to private patients. The Pemberdeen Laser Cosmetic Surgery Clinic Limited owns and manages the service.
The service carries out about 400 cosmetic procedures a year, predominantly breast augmentation. Most procedures are day cases, with a small number of overnight admissions. There are no critical care facilities available at the service.
Services are available to people paying for one-off treatment.
We carried out a comprehensive inspection of The Belvedere Private Hospital on 4 and 5 August 2015. The inspection formed part of a pilot programme of inspections in independent healthcare settings. The inspection reviewed surgical services as this is the one core service provided by the service from the eight that that are usually inspected by the Care Quality Commission (CQC) as part of its approach to hospital inspection.
We have not published a rating for this service. CQC does not currently have a legal duty to award ratings for those hospitals that provide solely or mainly cosmetic surgery services.
We identified the service for inspection based on a history of non-compliance with regulations.
Overall we found the quality of care was unsatisfactory and needed urgent improvement. Our key findings are as follows:
Are services safe at this hospital/service
• There were continuing breaches of regulations with regard to infection prevention and control. We found clinical waste from the previous day in the ward bins after patients had been admitted to the ward. There was no action plan to remedy issues found in an external audit in June 2015. The domestic assistant cleaned the theatre regularly and disposed of clinical waste, but had not received training in the specific requirements for infection control and prevention in theatres or in waste disposal.
• The provider had commissioned external companies to carry out a fire risk assessment and a health and safety risk assessment. However, there was no formal plan to address the issues identified in these assessments and audits.
• The systems for the investigation of incidents and dissemination of learning from incidents were insufficiently robust and failed to ensure that the risk of recurrence was minimised. The incident policy had not been updated to incorporate the duty of candour.
• There was no backup anaesthetic machine and no plans to purchase one at the time of our inspection. One of the resuscitation trolleys jammed and would not fully open during our inspection. The manager immediately ordered a replacement. There were regular checks on theatre and other equipment. The manager had put in place processes ensure there were sufficient instrument sets and consumables to carry out planned procedures.
• The staffing levels were appropriate for the type procedures undertaken, and surgery did not take place without a full theatre team. Staff received mandatory training.
• Medicines were stored safely and there were regular, recorded checks of the temperature of the fridges storing medicines.
• Patient records were sometimes incomplete or contained inaccuracies.
• A nurse assessed all patients before surgery was confirmed.
• Surgical, medical and theatre staff followed the ‘five steps to safer surgery’ to ensure that safety checks were followed.
• Nurses monitored patients post-operatively and referred to the resident medical officers (RMO) on duty if necessary. On the rare occasions when recovery was not straight forward, patients went to the nearest NHS hospital emergency department. However, the RMOs on duty at the time of our inspection did not have advanced life support training: the anaesthetist in theatres was the only person on site with this training. There had been no practice emergency scenarios, and the service did not have a resuscitation lead.
Are services effective at this hospital/service
• The registered manager reviewed guidance, and maintained an overview of practice standards in theatres. There were checks in place to support adherence to these standards.
• The surgeons working at the service took professional responsibility for following national and Royal College of Surgeons guidance.
• There was no clinical audit programme to identify the standards the provider expected to meet or to monitor adherence to these. When there were audits, it was not clear whether these were new audits or re-audits and whether the service was ensuring the implementation of actions arising from them.
• The provider did not collate information about outcomes for patients, and the process for identifying areas for improvements relied on surgeons each reviewing outcomes and discussing these informally. When the Medical Advisory Committee (MAC) made decisions about changing practice, these were not always disseminated to surgeons.
• The MAC was responsible for granting and overseeing practicing privileges for the surgeons who carried out procedures. We were not assured that surgeons working privately were adhering to the General Medical Council (GMC) revalidation process.
• The manager and deputy manager had received appraisals and some training was identified as a result. There was a lack of clinical supervision or peer support for the manager. The manager checked that agency, bank and locum staff had appropriate qualification before engaging them. There was no assurance that domestic and administrative staff had the competencies required to undertake their allocated tasks.
• Surgeon's consultations with patients were sometimes brief, without evidence of discussions about risks or the expectations of the patient. Administrative staff provided further information to patients. None of the administrative or nursing staff had training in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 or were able to explain how the Act might be relevant to people seeking cosmetic surgery. There was always a waiting period, with time for the patient to reflect between their consultation with the surgeon and the signing of consent for the procedure.
• There were processes in place for the management of patients’ pain. Staff supported patients to eat and to drink enough fluids.
Are services caring at this hospital/service
• Patients we spoke with during the inspection confirmed that staff were kind, considerate and respectful.
• We observed interactions between the staff, consultants and patients and saw that staff were attentive and caring in their attitude, providing assurance and support when needed.
• Prospective patients were given written information about cosmetic surgery, including fees.
Are services responsive at this hospital/service
• The facilities and premises were appropriate for the services provided.
• The provider planned its services around patient demand. At the time of this inspection surgery was carried out over two (occasionally three) days every fortnight.
• Patients sometimes experienced delays because of the limited opening hours of the service, and procedures were sometimes at cancelled at late notice. There had been 27 operations cancelled over the past year.
• The written information given to patients was in English and there was no provision to provide interpreters for patients who did not speak and/or read English.
• The service had a complaints policy and procedure in place and there was information available for patients about how to raise concerns. Twelve complaints made in 2015 had been recorded and responded to. Most of these related to either cancelled operations or poor outcomes.
• Staff gave patients questionnaires so that they could feed back their experience of care. The majority of feedback from patients was positive.
Are services well led at this hospital/service
• The safety and quality of service was reliant on the manager, who was responsible for clinical governance, running the service, and managing risk. There was a history of instability, with a high turnover of managers, and of failure to set up processes and systems to support continuity.
• There was no system in place to identify, record, and address or mitigate risks. There was a disconnection between risk assessment and the identification of the resources to reduce the risk. The manager had identified areas for improvement, but the provider had no strategy to implement these. The provider did not have a credible business plan and there was evidence of poor financial standing with contractors.
• We were unable to establish that appropriate quality measurement systems were in place as relevant documentation was not available.
• Staff commented favourably on the changes made since the current manager took up her post. They felt she was approachable, visible and provided strong leadership. Feedback from patients was positive.
There were areas of poor practice where the provider needed to make improvements.
Importantly, the provider must ensure:
• A risk register is established, which records existing and potential risks, and identities action to address and mitigate the risks.
• There are effective systems to assess, monitor and improve the quality and safety of the services provided.
• There are processes in place to integrate information about risk and identified improvements with financial information in order to support decision-making.
• All incidents are recorded and appropriately investigated and, where required, notified to the Care Quality Commission.
• A programme of complete clinical audit cycles is established to monitor and improve quality of care.
• The medical advisory committee (MAC) reviews information about doctors and surgeons with practicing privileges and ensures they are complying with GMC requirements for registration.
• Lessons learnt from incidents or near misses, and decisions made at the MAC meetings and staff meetings are shared with staff.
• Policies and procedures are up-to-date, relevant to the provider and put into practice at the hospital.
• The registered manager has appropriate support to carry out her duties and to ensure the service operates safely in her absence.
• All staff are appropriately trained for the roles they perform.
• Long-term bank and agency staff receive an annual appraisal and regular supervision.
• Staff participate in simulation exercises so they are aware of the action they need to take in an emergency.
• There are infection prevention and control systems and processes in place.
• The hospital has sufficient equipment for the procedures it performs and for the safety of its patients.
• Appropriate risk assessments are carried out, recorded, reviewed and, where remedial action is identified, this is taken.
• Records are accurate, fit for purpose, and retained for an appropriate duration.
• Training and support is provided so that all relevant staff are familiar with the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and understand how they should apply it in practice.
• There is appropriate security in high-risk areas.
• There is a review the changes to the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014 (Part 3) (as amended) and, in particular, the duty of candour.
In addition the provider should:
• Provide evidence that surgeon’s consultations with prospective patients meet professional standards.
• Set up a forum for staff to give feedback.
• Review the staffing structure so staff share lead roles rather than all of them sitting with one person.
• Review its website to ensure all information provided is accurate and meets Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) and professional standards.
• Provide access to interpreter services for patients whose first language is not English.
• Establish lines of communication to ensure good practice guidelines and safety alerts are shared with all staff.
CQC has issued formal warnings to The Pemberdeen Laser Cosmetic Surgery Clinic Limited telling them that they must make improvements at the Belvedere Private Hospital in the following areas by 4 November 2015:
Regulation 12: Safe care and treatment. The service was failing to prevent people from receiving unsafe care and treatment and prevent avoidable harm or risk of harm.
Regulation 17: Good governance. The service was failing to make sure that providers have systems and processes that ensure that they are able to meet other requirements in this part of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014 (Regulations 4 to 20A).
Professor Sir Mike Richards
Chief Inspector of Hospitals