• Ambulance service

Archived: Arriva Transport Solutions - South West

3rd Floor, The Crescent Centre, Temple Back, Bristol, Avon, BS1 6EZ (0117) 943 9910

Provided and run by:
Arriva Transport Solutions Limited

All Inspections

11 to 13 and 21 December 2017

During a routine inspection

Arriva Transport Solutions- South West is operated by Arriva Transport Solutions Limited. The service provides non-emergency patient transport services.

We inspected this service using our comprehensive inspection methodology. We carried out the announced part of the inspection on 11, 12 and 13 December 2017, along with an unannounced visit to the provider on 21 December 2017.

To get to the heart of patients’ experiences of care and treatment, we ask the same five questions of all services: are they safe, effective, caring, responsive to people's needs, and well led?

Throughout the inspection, we took account of what people told us and how the provider understood and complied with the Mental Capacity Act 2005.

The main service provided by Arriva Transport solutions South West was patient transport services. Where our findings on patient transport services – for example, management arrangements – also apply to other services, we do not repeat the information but cross-refer to the patient transport services core service.

Services we do not rate

We regulate independent ambulance services but we do not currently have a legal duty to rate them. We highlight good practice and issues that service providers need to improve and take regulatory action as necessary.

We found the following issues that the service provider needs to improve

  • Not all incidents were being captured and some safeguarding concerns had been missed and lessons from complaints and incidents were not shared effectively with frontline staff.
  • Children (with escorts) and adults were being transported in mixed vehicles with no evidence of a risk assessment for this.
  • Operational staff did not have access to all policies and procedures necessary, there was no accessible deteriorating patients policy for staff out on the road or a policy to advise staff on the safe transportation of wheelchairs or the use of wheelchair seatbelts.
  • Arrangements to protect staff who were lone working were not sufficient, staff did not always receive call backs from control when requested in an emergency and staff who worked alone did not always receive welfare calls from the control room during and at the end of their shifts.
  • Control room staff did not always inform operational bases of staff sickness.
  • Only 23% of staff had received updated level 2 safeguarding training against a target of 85% and control room mandatory training was 62% against a target of 85%.
  • Only 51% of control room staff had received an appraisal in the 12 months to October 2017 against an 85% company target.
  • Staff vacancy reports showed 26 full-time equivalent (FTE) vacancies at the time of our inspection.
  • There was no embedded process to assess or monitor observed practices amongst call centre staff and dispatchers.
  • When crews were not made aware of specific infection risks by hospital staff they did not escalate them beyond the service.
  • Crews did not always have up to date information about patients’ resuscitation decisions as part of the booking form and other key information such as mobility status was sometimes missing or incorrect.
  • Best practice guidance had been used to develop some policies and procedures but staff had no awareness of any best practice guidance beyond this.
  • The service was consistently missing some key performance indicators for renal dialysis patients and oncology patients.
  • Data provided in Clinical Commissioning Group reports did not reflect the actual number of cancelled journeys that were attributable to Arriva and there were discrepancies in data.
  • Some data related to serious incident reporting was not accurate and did not give assurances all information used to monitor and manage quality and performance was accurate.
  • There were no communication aids or information for patients who were visually impaired, hard of hearing or who had learning disabilities.
  • The governance framework and management systems did not provide assurance that all third party providers had been reviewed for assurance of Disclosure and Barring Service checks (DBS), driving licences and vehicle insurance.
  • There were no individual risk assessments to support decisions to not carry out disclosure and barring service checks (DBS) for roles that were not eligible for DBS checks, including the financial director and some call centre staff.
  • Staff had been involved in the development of the Arriva values although some staff were unaware of them.
  • A senior manager acknowledged they needed to be more aware of the requirements of the registered manager post they had applied for.

However, we found the following areas of good practice:

  • A new incidents and complaints manager had been employed to oversee the quality, communication and was starting to share learning from incident investigations.
  • A computer system allowed all vehicle defects to be monitored both centrally and at a local level.
  • A new recruitment coordinator had reduced staffing vacancies and produced weekly monitoring reports of recruitment progress.
  • There was an effective business continuity plan that prioritised patients with the greatest needs.
  • Crews were dedicated and resilient when faced with adverse weather and worked to get to patients with greatest needs.
  • The service had recently implemented a day before and on the day text messaging service and was monitoring its effectiveness as part of its engagement with the CCGs.
  • Significant changes had been made in transport for patients for renal dialysis that included a coordinator and dedicated vehicles.
  • The service was achieving its target in five out of six key-performance indicators (KPI) for renal dialysis patients.
  • The service was achieving its target in four out of six KPIs for oncology patients.
  • Most operational staff had received an appraisal in the 12 months to October 2017, and all ambulance stations met the company target of 85%.
  • Staff were respectful to patients and kind in their interactions with patients, taking time to confirm names and destinations.
  • Staff ensured they did all they could to maintain patients’ dignity.
  • Staff accommodated additional family members or carers for the most vulnerable patients including children.
  • Staff understood the eligibility criteria and made sure patients understood who was eligible for non-emergency patient transport services and why.
  • Staff talked with patients during their journeys which patients said ‘made their day’.
  • The service engaged with commissioners and there was evidence of service improvements for the dialysis group of patients as a result.
  • The service was working towards two Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (CQUINs) targets and had recently implemented a day before and en-route text service for some patients.
  • Most complaints were responded to within the 25-day target company target.
  • Senior managers had a realistic strategy for achieving their vision and priorities in order to deliver good quality care, and understood the key drivers for providing effective non-emergency patient transport service.
  • The governance framework and management systems had recently been reviewed and improved following a lapse in governance that had led to disciplinary action and restructure.
  • There were comprehensive assurance and service performance measures, which were reported and monitored. Action was taken to improve performance.
  • We saw that assurances for volunteer car drivers for DBS, insurance, vehicle roadworthiness or MOT and licence to drive were effective.
  • Most staff we spoke with felt respected and valued and those we were able to speak with felt that managers demonstrated openness and honesty. Organisational change was handled openly.
  • Most full and part time staff felt actively engaged so that their views were reflected in the planning and delivery of services and in shaping the culture.
  • Most leaders and managers had the capacity, capability and experience to lead services effectively.
  • Leaders tried to ensure that people who used services, those close to them and their representatives were actively engaged and involved in decision-making and improving the quality of services.
  • All staff we spoke with were focused on continually improving the quality of care. When leaders considered developments to services or efficiency changes, they used both quantitative data and patient experience to inform the change.
  • Leaders and staff strived for continuous learning, improvement and innovation. The service sought to innovate and explore new ways of working with CCG and other stakeholders.

Following this inspection, we told the provider that it must take some actions to comply with the regulations and that it should make other improvements, even though a regulation had not been breached, to help the service improve. We also issued the provider with five requirement notices that affected patient transport services. Details are at the end of the report.

Amanda Stanford

Deputy Chief Inspector of Hospitals

On behalf of

The Chief Inspector of Hospitals

19, 20, 21 July 2016

During an inspection looking at part of the service

Arriva Transport Solutions South West is part of Arriva Transport Solutions Limited, a nationwide provider of independent, non-emergency patient transport services. Arriva Transport Solutions Limited is part of an international transport group.

We did not rate Arriva Transport Solutions - South West as they have not yet had an announced comprehensive inspection. We carried out an unannounced focussed inspection on 19, 20 and 21 July 2016 to review the service’s arrangements for the safe transport of patients. We did this following concerns raised by a number of patient organisations and hospital trusts after an increase in delays to travel times affecting both transport to appointments and return home.

Our key findings were as follows:

  • We saw evidence of learning that directly benefited patients such as reviewing and developing patient feedback processes. There were plans for 2016/17 to continue working with commissioners on learning from the level of harm, as well as distress, caused by incidents of delayed transport, to ensure quality improvements improved patient experience
  • Staff were aware of their responsibilities to report incidents to managers. We saw incident reporting that covered what staff did to manage resuscitation if patients needed it, safeguarding regarding staff, and patients, and injuries during transport.
  • Staff we spoke with were aware of their responsibilities regarding duty of candour and understood the importance of being open and transparent with patients when things go wrong.
  • Mandatory training for the coming months had been planned as mandatory training records showed that not all staff had received the yearly training. However targets and completion of mandatory training overall was high compared to other organisations.
  • There were reliable systems, processes and practices in place to protect adults, children and young people from avoidable harm. The patients we spoke with during this inspection told us they felt safe with the staff and in the vehicles.
  • There was an infection prevention and control policy and system that described decontamination of medical devices, vehicles and workwear. Overall we found stations we visited to be visibly clean and tidy. We saw evidence of when vehicles and equipment were last cleaned and when it was next due.
  • People’s needs were assessed and transport provided to patients in line with national and local guidelines. The eligibility criteria required call takers to ask prompted questions about the patient’s condition, health and mobility status, which determined the most appropriate type of transport required.
  • We saw that people were treated with kindness, dignity, respect and compassion while they received care. We received positive comments about ambulance crew from patients, patient’s relatives and from staff working at local hospitals we spoke with. Crew were described as 'wonderful' and 'brilliant.' Another patient described crew as ‘lovely’ and said they could not do enough to help.
  • Crew encouraged patients to be as independent as possible and provided support where required. We observed crew members enabling and encouraging patients to move independently, providing support and advice where appropriate
  • The service ensured that lessons were learnt when things went wrong and actions taken as result of complaints. Learning included, reflection on attitude even when complaints not upheld, acknowledging that increases in demand affected journeys and journey times.
  • There was a clear vision and credible strategy to support quality care. We saw evidence that the key to good non-emergency patient transport was understood by the relevant staff. There were governance frameworks in place to support staff to know their responsibilities and that quality, performance and risks were understood and informed action plans. However, senior managers acknowledged that there was some way to go in a number of areas. For example, achieving key performance indicators, reducing the number of complaints related to delays.
  • Patients and others who used the service and staff were engaged and involved in several ways. Patients were engaged in a survey run by an external company and fed back to the service. The number of returns was small and the result of the patient feedback survey was mixed and reflected both positive and negative comments.
  • Managers and others told us of a culture that encouraged candour, openness and honesty. We saw evidence of this and senior managers spoke broadly about the duty of candour and how it applied to service delivery.
  • Patient records were created at the control centre and received by ambulance crew on the electronic tablet associated with each particular vehicle. Control staff collected relevant information during the booking process so that they recorded the information regarding patient’s health and circumstances. Several of the provider’s ambulance crews reported that the information provided on the patient record was sometimes incorrect, out of date or very limited which had been raised with the organisations that had supplied the information.

However

  • Staff level was at 85% for road based staff and there was a recruitment plan in place. The service used bank and volunteer staff when necessary.
  • Not all lessons were learned when things went wrong. Staff told us that it was difficult to report incidents on the electronic system. They said they frequently experienced long waits when calling the control room to report incidents so some potential for improvements were not identified when things went wrong.
  • There was not a robust system in place to make sure defects in the vehicles were recorded and always actioned in a timely way and vehicles were not always taken off the road for repair.
  • Delays and long waiting times for patient outbound journeys from clinics were a recurring theme amongst staff we spoke with at the local hospital and patients. We saw that the service had investigated all incidents or were in process of doing so. Themes included, the service arriving late and other organisations moving patients to a different location and not letting the service know or providing incorrect mobility information.
  • Staff were not supported to be able to communicate with patients who were significantly hearing or vision impaired.
  • Service delivery did not always meet people’s needs. We saw evidence of mixed patient experience and missed key performance indicators in reports from external stakeholders such as Healthwatch Gloucestershire and clinical commissioning group reports. The service was working with stakeholders to improve the service and had recently undergone a management recruitment and restructure in order to deliver the requirements of their contract in 2016 and beyond.

We saw several areas of outstanding practice including:

  • Control and road based staff recognised where they could help patients. Staff went out of their way to assist patients we were told by a patient of an example of staff amending their journey to help a patient who was delayed by another provider. There were other examples that we saw in the incident recording, where staff had identified issues that patients needed assistance with at home and had completed tasks before leaving to ensure the patient was safe as well as emotionally supported.

However, there were also areas of poor practice where the location needs to make improvements.

Importantly, the location must:

  • Ensure that mandatory training observations, appraisals and yearly updates for all staff are carried out and up to date including the high dependency ambulance vehicle staff.
  • Ensure that the process in place to record defects in vehicles was recorded and actioned in a timely way was followed.

The location should:

  • Ensure that the process for staff to be informed of updated policies, procedures and quality and governance updates is followed and records kept
  • Ensure that all equipment and particularly those used to take measurements of patients’ blood pressure and oxygen saturation levels are listed on equipment servicing records and serviced and maintained within specified dates.
  • Ensure that systems for control to communicate between operational or road based staff enable timely communication via telephone calls and text messaging so that messages about patient’s condition or incidents were able to be shared.
  • Ensure that policies and procedures for disposal of clinical waste are followed.
  • Ensure that battery life for equipment used for text and voice communication is fit for purpose and is reliable
  • Ensure that the process for identifying poor performance that needed to be addressed and managed formally was followed.

In addition the location should:

  • Consider how staff receive feedback from any incidents they report.
  • Consider whether Mental Capacity Act 2005 and deprivation of liberty safeguards training meet staff needs.
  • Consider aids for staff to be able to communicate with patients with significant sight or hearing impairment are available.
  • Consider reviewing the process and questions for call taking for identifying mental health and other support needs a patient may have once scripted prompts are exhausted.
  • Consider carrying out a review of patients comfort in vehicles.
  • Consider whether electronic alerts that the planning and control room staff used on patient records that included the word complaint complies with records keeping best practice.
  • Consider the method for journey time allocations and whether post code allocation is detailed enough.
  • Consider increasing the opportunity for road based staff and control based staff to understand each other’s role better.

Professor Sir Mike Richards

Chief Inspector of Hospitals